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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
ROBERT ELLIS COX, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
Sup. Ct. Case No. 20040894-SC 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This case is before the Court on a grant of a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The order granting certiorari review framed the sole issue as follows: 
Whether an appellate court has authority to remand for nunc-pro-tunc resentencing 
after it has determined it lacks jurisdiction over a direct appeal from a criminal conviction? 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews "the court of appeals' decision for 
correctness and grant[s] no deference to its conclusions of law." State v. Shipp, 2005 UT 35, 
18, _ P.3d _ (citing State v. James, 2000 UT 80, ^  8,13 P.3d 576). "Jurisdictional issues 
are likewise reviewed for correctness." State v. Finlayson, 2004 UT 10, \ 5, 84 P.3d 1193. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The text of the following constitutional, statutory, and rule provisions are reproduced 
in Addendum B: 
Utah Const., art. VIII, §§ 3, 4; 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (West 2004) (Supreme Court jurisdiction); 
Utah Code Ann. § 78~2a-3 (West 2004) (Court of Appeals jurisdiction); 
Utah R. App. P. 2; 
Utah R. App. P. 4. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
Defendant was charged with four counts of sodomy on a child, four counts of 
aggravated sexual abuse of a child, and one count of rape of a child, all first degree felonies. 
Rl 18-21. On 15 October 2003, a jury found defendant guilty on all counts. R161-76. 
On 5 December 2003, defendant filed a motion for new trial. R182. Defendant was 
sentenced three days later, on 8 December 2003. R203-06. On 11 March 2004, the trial 
court denied defendant's motion for new trial. R263-65. On 8 April 2004, defendant filed 
his notice of appeal. R266. 
On 30 April 2004, the State moved this Court to dismiss defendant's appeal for lack 
of jurisdiction because defendant's notice of appeal was untimely. The State's motion 
explained that defendant's new trial motion was filed prematurely— before sentencing— and 
was therefore untimely. See State v. Putnik, 2002 UT 122, ^ 7-8. This meant that 
defendant's new trial motion did not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal. See id at 3-8; 
!The underlying facts are irrelevant to the question on review. Thus, this brief will 
only present the procedural history of the case. 
2 
see also Utah R. App. P. 4(b). Thus, to be timely, defendant's notice of appeal had to be 
filed no later than 7 January 2004, thirty days after sentencing. See Utah R. App. P. 4; 
Putnik, 2002 UT 122,110. Because defendant did not file his notice of appeal until three 
months later, on 8 April 2004, it was untimely and this Court lacked jurisdiction over the 
appeal. 
Without ruling on the State's motion to dismiss, this Court transferred the case to the 
court of appeals. The court of appeals issued a sua sponte motion for summary disposition, 
also on the ground that the notice of appeal was untimely because defendant's new trial 
motion was premature and did not toll the time for appeal. 
Instead of responding to the two motions, defendant filed a "Motion to Temporarily 
Remand for Resentencing." State v. Cox, 2004 UT App 277, at page 2. (A copy of the court 
of appeals' unpublished decision is attached at Addendum A). Defendant's motion conceded 
that his notice of appeal was untimely, but argued that the appeal should not be dismissed. 
Instead, defendant argued, the appeal should be temporarily remanded to the trial court for 
nunc pro tunc resentencing. Id. See also Defendant's Supporting Memorandum, attached 
as Addendum C. The court of appeals denied defendant's motion because when "a notice 
of appeal is untimely filed, [an appellate court] lacks jurisdiction to do anything other than 
dismiss the action." Id. at page 1 (citing Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 
570 (Utah App. 1989)). The court of appeals informed defendant, however, that he could 
seek nunc pro tunc resentencing through a post-conviction petition in the district court. Id. 
3 
at pages 2-3 (citing State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981) and Manning v. State, 
2004 UT App 87, \ 20, 89 P.3d 196, cert granted by 98 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2004). 
This Court granted defendant's timely petition for a writ of certiorari. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is well-settled in this state that an appellate court lacks jurisdiction over an untimely 
appeal. It is equally well-settled that when an appellate court lacks jurisdiction, it must 
dismiss the appeal. Indeed, courts universally recognize that a court without jurisdiction 
lacks the authority to do anything but dismiss the appeal. 
Defendant concedes both that his notice of appeal was untimely and that the court of 
appeals lacked jurisdiction over his appeal. He nevertheless claims that the court of appeals 
erred in dismissing his appeal. Defendant argues that the court of appeals should have 
instead remanded his untimely appeal to the district court with an order that he be 
resentenced so as to restart the time for appeal. 
But, as stated, the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to do anything but dismiss the 
untimely appeal. Neither this Court's inherent supervisory authority nor its writ authority 
authorizes an appellate court to suspend, circumvent, or enlarge the time limits for appealing 
in rule 4, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, the court of appeals properly dismissed the 
appeal and left defendant to pursue emy right to resentencing in the district court. 
4 
ARGUMENT 
BECAUSE AN APPELLATE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO DO 
ANYTHING BUT DISMISS AN UNTIMELY APPEAL, IT DOES NOT 
HAVE AUTHORITY TO REMAND FOR NUNC-PRO-TUNC 
RESENTENCING 
Jurisdiction is "[a] court's power to decide a case or issue a decree.55 Black's Law 
Dictionary 867 (8th ed. 2004). See also Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, % 38, 100 P.3d 1177 
(subject matter jurisdiction is "the authority of the court to decide the case55). In Utah, it is 
well-settled that an appellate court does not have the power or jurisdiction to decide an 
untimely appeal. See State v. Bowers, 2002 UT 100, f 5, 57 P.3d 1065. The question before 
this Court is whether an appellate court in general, and the court of appeals in particular, has 
jurisdiction in an untimely appeal to remand to the district court with directions to resentence 
the defendant, so as to restart the time for appeal. 
As explained below, the answer is unequivocally "no.55 An appellate court that lacks 
jurisdiction to decide an untimely appeal necessarily lacks jurisdiction to order any kind of 
relief for the appellant. Rather, the appellate court has power only to dismiss the untimely 
appeal. Contrary to defendant's argument, neither this Court's inherent supervisory power 
nor its writ authority permits either it, or the court of appeals, to enlarge its appellate 
jurisdiction. This is true even when it appears obvious that the appellant may be entitled to 
relief in some other forum, such as resentencing in the district court. 
5 
A. When a matter is outside a court's jurisdiction it retains only the authority to 
dismiss the action. 
1. An appellate court lacks jurisdiction over an untimely appeal. 
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires that a notice of appeal be filed 
"within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from." Utah R. App. 4(a). A 
timely motion for new trial under mle 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, tolls the time 
for appeal. Utah R. App. 4(b). If a timely rule 24 motion is filed, the time for appeal runs 
from the entry of the order denying a new trial, rather than from the final judgment. See State 
v. Putnik, 2002 UT 122, ^  4, 63 P.3d 91. An untimely motion for new trial, however, does 
not toll the time for appeal. Id. at 10. If, as here, an untimely motion for new trial is filed, 
the notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the final judgment, which in 
criminal cases, is the sentence. See id; Bowers, 2002 UT 100, ^ 4. Defendant concedes, as 
he did in the court of appeals, that his notice of appeal was untimely. Br. Pet. 3,5. 
"Failure to file a timely notice of appeal deprives this court of jurisdiction over the 
appeal." See Reisbeckv. HCA Health Services of Utah, Inc., 2000 UT 48, \ 5, 2 P.3d 447. 
See also State v. Houskeeper, 2002 UT 118,123, 62 P.3d 444; Bowers, 2002 UT 100, t 5; 
Miller v. USAA Casualty Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6, \ 20-21, 44 P.3d 663; State v. Johnson, 635 
P.2d 36, 37 (Utah 1981); State v. Boggess, 601 P.2d 927, 928-29 (Utah 1979). This is true 
in both civil and criminal appeals. See id.; State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d at 37. 
An appellate court does not have the authority to enlarge the time for appeal. 
Johnson, 635 P.2d at 37. See also Bowers, 2002 UT 100, ^ f 5 ("This court has no authority 
6 
to extend its jurisdiction beyond the 30-day period for filing notice of appeal plainly stated 
in [rule 4]"). "Nor does this court have power to transubstantiate an untimely notice of 
appeal into a timely one." Bowers, 2002 UT 100, \ 5. And while an appellate court may 
suspend many of the rules of appellate procedure, it may not suspend the time limits in rule 
4. See Utah R. App. 2. 
In sum, an appellate court lacks jurisdiction over an untimely appeal. 
2. An appellate court must dismiss an untimely appeal. 
This Court has stated that an appellate court must dismiss untimely appeals: [I]t is 
'axiomatic in this jurisdiction that failure to perfect an appeal is a jurisdictional failure, 
requiring dismissal of the appeal'" Bowers, 2002 UT 100, \ 5 (quoting Prowswood v. 
Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952, 955 (Utah 1984)) (emphasis added). Thus, once 
an appellate court determines that it lacks jurisdiction, it has no choice but to dismiss the 
appeal. See Johnson, 635 P.2d at 37 ("Out-of-time appeals mustbe dismissed.") (emphasis 
added); Miller v. USAA Casualty Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6, lj 20, 44 P.3d 663 ("If we lack 
jurisdiction, we must dismiss."); Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, f 8,5 P.3d 649 ("Where 
an appeal is not properly taken, this court lacks jurisdiction and we must dismiss."). Cf 
State v. Payne, 892 P.2d 1032, 1033 (Utah 1995) (if district court, at any point during trial, 
becomes aware that it lacks jurisdiction, it "must immediately dismiss the action"). 
Because defendant has conceded the untimeliness of his appeal, the court of appeals 
properly followed the foregoing authority and dismissed defendant's appeal. 
7 
3. An appellate court can do nothing beyond dismissing an untimely appeal. 
The question here, however, is whether the court of appeals could, in addition to 
dismissing the appeal, temporarily remand to the district court with instructions to resentence 
defendant so as to restart the time for appeal. It could not. 
American courts, including both Utah courts, have universally recognized that a court 
lacking jurisdiction has no authority to do anything but dismiss the case. See, e.g., Nebeker 
v. Utah State Tax Comm yn, 2001 UT 74, \ 24, 34 P.3d 180 (citing Blaine Hudson Printing 
v. Utah Tax Comm % 870 P.2d 291, 292 (Utah App. 1994), for proposition that an agency 
without subject matter jurisdiction "lacks the power to do anything beyond dismissing the 
proceedings"); Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 161 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah App. 1989) 
("When a matter is outside the court's jurisdiction it retains only the authority to dismiss the 
action."); Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah App. 1987) ("Upon a 
determination by the Court that its jurisdiction is lacking, its authority extends no further 
than to dismiss the action."). See also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 
U.S. 83,94 (1998) ("Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the 
only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the 
cause."); Blankenship v. Blankenship, 893 So.2d 303, 307 (Ala. 2004) (a court lacking 
subject matter jurisdiction "may take no action other than to exercise its power to dismiss the 
action"); Indiana Family andSoc. Servs. Admin, v. Legacy Healthcare, Inc., 756N.E.2d 567, 
572 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (where court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it is "without 
jurisdiction to do anything in the case except to enter an order of dismissal"); University of 
8 
Kansas v. Dep't of Human Resources, 887 P.2d 1147, 1150 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) ("When 
a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of an action, its authority extends no further than to 
dismiss the action."); McCleese v. Todd, 591 N.W.2d 375, 377 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) 
("When a court is without jurisdiction of the subject matter, any action with respect to such 
a cause, other than to dismiss it, is absolutely void"); State v. Oxenhandler, 159 S.W.3d 417, 
420 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction "may take no action 
other than to dismiss the suit"); Lurie v. Blackwell, 948 P.2d 1161, 1164 (Mont. 1997) 
("Once a court has determined that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction . . . the only further 
action it can take is to dismiss the case."); St. John Medical Center v. Dep }t of Social and 
Health Servs., 38 P.3d 383, 388 (Wash. App. 2002) ("A court lacking jurisdiction may do 
nothing more than enter an order of dismissal."); Geerts v. Jacobsen, 100 P.3d 1265, 1269 
(Wyo. 2004) (unless court has jurisdiction, "it lacks authority to proceed, and any decision, 
judgment, or other order is, as a matter of law, utterly void and of no effect for any 
9 
purpose").2 In other words, an appellate court lacks jurisdiction in an untimely appeal to 
issue any orders except an order of dismissal. 
The court of appeals correctly followed the foregoing universal rule when it dismissed 
defendant's appeal and denied his motion to temporarily remand for resentencing. State v. 
Cox, 2004 UT App 277, at 1 ("When a notice of appeal is untimely filed, this court lacks 
jurisdiction to do anything other than dismiss the action"). Granting defendant's motion 
would have required the court of appeals to act without jurisdiction. The court of appeals, 
therefore, properly dismissed defendant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction and declined to issue 
an order clearly outside its jurisdiction. 
2See also Ex parte CL.C, 897 So.2d 234, 237 (Ala. 2004) ("[W]hen [a] court has 
no power to sit, nor has general jurisdiction over that nature of proceeding or over the 
parties, it cannot make any effective order.") (Brackets in original); People v. Rivera-
Bottzeck, 2004 WL 3017269, P.3d (Colo. App. 2004) ("Any action taken by a 
court which lacks jurisdiction is a nullity."); Diaz v. Provena Hospitals, 817 N.E.2d 206, 
213 (111. Ct. App. 2004) ("An order or judgment is void if the court lacked personal or 
subject matter jurisdiction or otherwise lacked the power to decide the particular matter 
presented to it."); Ardoin v. Stine Lumber Co., Inc., 885 So.2d 43, 49 (La. Ct. App. 2004) 
("As a general rule, any action taken by a court without proper subject-matter jurisdiction 
is an absolute nullity."); Folk Integrated Technologies, Inc., v. Stack, 513 S.E.2d 572, 574 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1999) ("A universal principle as old as the law is that the proceedings of a 
court without jurisdiction of the subject matter are a nullity."); Trottier v. Bird, 635 
N.W.2d 157, 159 (N.D. 2001) ("As a prerequisite to issuing a valid order or judgment, a 
court must have both subject matter and personal jurisdiction."); Pratts v. Hurley, 806 
N.E.2d 992, 996 (Ohio 2004) ("If a court acts without jurisdiction, then any proclamation 
by that court is void."); Bancorp Group, Inc. v. Pirgos, Inc., 744 A.2d 791, 792 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2000) ("[A]ction taken by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity.") (Brackets 
in original); Suntrust Bank, Nashville v. Johnson, 46 S.W.3d 216, 221 (Term. Ct. App. 
2000) ("Without subject matter jurisdiction, a court cannot enter valid, enforceable 
order"); Green v. State, 906 S.W.2d 937 (Tex. Crim. Ct. App. 1995) ("[I]t is . . . 
axiomatic that where there is no jurisdiction, the power of the court to act is as absent as 
if it did not exist,.. . and any order entered by a court having no jurisdiction is void.") 
(Brackets in original and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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B. This Court has always followed the universal rule that an appellate court lacks 
authority to do anything but to dismiss an untimely appeal, even when it appears 
on the record that defendant lost his appeal due to counsel's ineffectiveness. 
Defendant acknowledges that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction over his appeal 
Br. Pet. 9. But, he argues, "[wjhile an appellate court may lack jurisdiction to consider a 
direct appeal from defendant's convictions, the lack of jurisdiction does not preclude the 
court from saying something about the matter." Id. 
Defendant is correct that a lack of jurisdiction does not prevent a court from "saying 
something" about the matter. Id. Indeed, as defendant rightly points out, appellate courts 
lacking jurisdiction sometimes issue what are, in effect, advisory opinions suggesting 
procedures to be followed to invoke the court's jurisdiction or to otherwise obtain relief. See, 
e.g., State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 37 (Utah 1981) (dismissing untimely appeal, but 
explaining how defendant may still obtain direct appellate review by seeking resentencing 
in post-conviction proceedings); State v. Jiminez, 93 8 P.2d 264,265 (Utah 1997) (dismissing 
untimely appeal, but informing defendant that he may seek Johnson resentencing through 
post-conviction petition). But while a lack of jurisdiction does not prevent a court from 
"saying something," it does, as explained above, prevent a court from ordering something. 
Moreover, defendant here did not ask the court of appeals to merely "say something" 
about jurisdiction. Rather, he asked the court of appeals not to dismiss his untimely appeal, 
and to temporarily remand with an order directing the district court to resentence him. Add. 
C. at 1-2. In other words, defendant asked the court of appeals to help him cure the 
jurisdictional defect in his appeal by, in effect, enlarging the time for appeal. Such an order 
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would have been a clear violation of rule 2, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, which 
prohibits an appellate court from suspending the time limits in rule 4. The court of appeals, 
therefore, correctly held that it had only the power to dismiss the appeal and that it lacked 
jurisdiction to temporarily remand with an order in effect granting defendant relief in the 
form of resentencing. 
In State v. Johnson, this Court recognized that it was powerless to grant the relief 
defendant seeks. Johnson, like defendant, also filed an untimely notice of appeal. Johnson, 
635 P.2d at 37. Johnson claimed that he asked his attorney to file an appeal within the 30-
day time limit, but his attorney failed to do so. Id. Thus, Johnson, like defendant, claimed 
that his attorney alone was to blame for his untimely notice of appeal. Id. at 37. Johnson 
asked this Court to extend the time for appeal so that he could obtain direct appellate review 
of his conviction. Id. 
This Court noted that the "30-day period for filing a notice of appeal in a criminal case 
is jurisdictional and cannot be enlarged by this Court." Id. (citations omitted). Because it 
lacked jurisdiction over the untimely appeal, this Court explained that it had to deny 
Johnson's request, and dismiss the appeal. See id. 
But this Court was concerned that defendant had been denied both his state 
constitutional right to appeal his conviction and his federal constitutional right to the 
effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 37-38. Accordingly, the Court explained—for the 
benefit of Johnson, lower courts, and future similarly-situated defendants—how Johnson 
should proceed to obtain a direct appeal. Id. 
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The Court first explained that Johnson's "remedy to establish the denial of his right 
to appeal is not in this Court; it lies in the district court, which can receive evidence 
(including the taking of oral testimony, if necessary) and make findings of fact." Id. at 38. 
The Court then instructed Johnson to seek this remedy under then-applicable post-conviction 
procedures. Id. If Johnson could prove that he lost his right to appeal as a result of his 
counsel's ineffectiveness, the district court could grant relief by resentencing Johnson so as 
to restart the time for appeal. Id. In this way, Johnson could timely invoke this Court's 
appellate jurisdiction. 
The Johnson court, however, did not remand to the district court to hold a hearing on 
Johnson's factual allegations. Nor did it remand to the district court with instructions to 
resentence Johnson. Rather, it simply dismissed the appeal—just as it said it must do given 
its lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 37-38. 
Defendant suggests that this Court may nevertheless remand and direct resentencing 
because, unlike in Johnson, "the existing record [in this case] already supports that counsel 
was ineffective in perfecting [defendant]'s appeal." Br. Pet. 29. Thus, defendant reasons, 
there is no need to require him to resort to post-conviction proceedings for the purpose of 
developing a factual record. Id. 
But Johnson's dismissal of the appeal was based, not on the lack of a settled factual 
predicate, but on the Court's lack of jurisdiction over an untimely appeal. See Johnson, 635 
P.2d at 37. Thus, even if the record in Johnson had conclusively established counsel's 
ineffectiveness, the Court still lacked jurisdiction and so was still required to dismiss the 
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appeal. See id. See also State v. Jiminez, 938 P.2d 264,265 (Utah 1997). Because the Court 
had authority to only dismiss, it necessarily lacked jurisdiction to issue any other orders. 
This Court's post-Johnson opinions are consistent with this approach. For example, 
in State v. Jiminez, 938 P.2d 264 (Utah 1997), the defendant lost his right to appeal because 
his attorney did not file a timely notice of appeal after the trial court had disposed of his 
timely new trial motion. This Court dismissed because it lacked jurisdiction over the 
untimely appeal. Id. Although it appeared as obvious from that record as it does from this 
one that Jiminez lost his right to appeal because of his counsel's procedural missteps, this 
Court did not remand to the district court for resentencing. Rather, it dismissed the appeal 
and informed Jiminez that he could seek resentencing in the trial court by filing a post-
conviction petition under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act and rule 65C, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Id. 
The defendant in State v. Bowers, 2002 UT 100, likewise lost the right to appeal his 
conviction due to his attorney's procedural missteps. Bowers timely filed a motion to arrest 
judgment between verdict and sentencing. Id. at % 2; see Utah R. App. P. 23. Unlike a rule 
24 motion for new trial, however, a rule 23 motion to arrest judgment does not toll the time 
for appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 4(b). The trial court issued its findings, conclusions, and 
order denying the motion to arrest judgment after sentencing, but before the time for appeal 
had passed. Id. at *|fl[ 2-3. Bowers filed his notice of appeal within 30 days of the denial of 
his motion to arrest judgement, but more than 30 days after sentencing. Id. at ^ 3-4. This 
Court dismissed Bowers's untimely appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at f 5. 
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Again, it was just as obvious from the procedural history in Bowers as it is here, that 
Bowers lost his appeal due to his counsel's ineffectiveness. Yet this Court did not remand 
to the trial court for resentencing. Indeed, it did not even inform Bowers that he could seek 
resentencing through post-conviction proceedings. Rather, this Court affirmed that the 30-
day limit for appealing was jurisdictional, that the Court did not have the power to enlarge 
the time for appeal or "to transubstantiate an untimely notice of appeal into timely one," and 
that "failure to perfect an appeal is a jurisdictional failure, requiring dismissal of the appeal." 
Id. atf 5. 
After Bowers, this Court affirmed the dismissal of a criminal appeal on procedural 
facts identical to this case. See State v. Putnik, 2002 UT 122, 63 P.3d 91. Putnik, like 
defendant, filed a premature, and therefore untimely, motion for new trial. Id. at fflf 1, 8. 
While Putnik's notice of appeal was timely as to the denial of his new trial motion, it was 
untimely as to his sentence. Id. at f^ 1, 4. Accordingly, the court of appeals dismissed 
Putnik's appeal. Id. at^ f 1. 
On certiorari review, this Court simply affirmed the court of appeals' dismissal of 
Putnik's appeal: 
Because petitioner did not file his motion for a new trial within the time frame 
mandated in rule 24, he was required to file his motion for appeal within thirty 
days of sentencing. He failed to do so. The court of appeals properly 
dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
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Id. at f 10. However obvious it may have been that Putnik lost his appeal due to his 
counsel's mistakes, this Court neither remanded nor ordered resentencing. Id. Nor did this 
Court tell Putnik how he could obtain a direct appeal through resentencing. Id. 
In short, none of this Court's precedent supports defendant's contention that an 
appellate court may, in an untimely appeal, remand to the district court with instructions to 
resentence the defendant. To the contrary, Johnson, Jiminez, Bowers, and Putnik all 
followed the universal rule—that a court lacking jurisdiction retains only the authority to 
dismiss the action. The court of appeals, therefore, did not err in following that precedent. 
C. This Court's inherent supervisory powers may not be invoked to circumvent the 
time limits of rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
For the first time in this case, defendant asserts that this Court "may invoke its 
supervisory powers to remand for resentencing in a case, even when it lacks jurisdiction over 
an appeal from the convictions." Br. Pet. 11. Defendant did not argue this claim to the court 
of appeals, see Add. C, nor did he raise it in his petition for certiorari review. This Court 
should therefore decline to address this claim. 
In any event, defendant has no valid supervisory authority claim. On certiorari, this 
Court reviews the court of appeals' decision for error. See State v. Shipp, 2005 UT 35, f^ 8, 
P.3d . Here, even if defendant had raised the claim below, the court of appeals could 
not have remanded pursuant to "inherent supervisory authority," because—as will become 
apparent below—the court of appeals, unlike this Court, has no such authority. Thus, the 
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court of appeals did not err in not invoking its supervisory authority to remand for 
resentencing. 
But should this Court nevertheless address this issue for the first on certiorari review, 
no precedent supports defendant's supervisory authority argument. 
"This court's supervisory power is an inherent power which has been recognized in 
many cases." State v. Bennett, 2000 UT 34, f 13, 999 P.2d 1 (Durham, J., concurring in the 
result) (citing 15 cases). Citing to the Utah Constitution, Justice Durrant has suggested that 
it "stems from [the Court's] authority Ho adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used 
in the courts of the state.'" State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, \ 81, 63 P.3d 621 (Durrant, J., 
dissenting in part and concurring in part) (quoting Utah Const, art. VIII, § 4). Article VIII, 
section 4 of the Utah Constitution could in fact be read to mean that the Court's supervisory 
power is limited to rule-making: "The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and 
evidence to be used in the courts of the state and shall by rule manage the appellate process." 
While this Court has invoked its "inherent supervisory power" with some frequency 
since State ex rel Clatter buck, 700 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1985), its precise sources, 
character, and limits remain unclear. Its bounds have never been staked or even debated. 
Indeed, this power is so ill-defined that one justice of this Court, referring to "our so-called 
supervisory powers," added, "whatever that means apart from our appellate power." State 
v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 350, 360 n.6 (Utah 1996) (Stewart, J. dissenting). Similarly, the 
question of whether to invoke supervisory power to fill perceived gaps in state criminal rules 
or constitutional provisions recently splintered this Court. See Maestas, 2002 UT 123, f^ 45 
17 
(Durham, C J.), fflf 80-83 (Durrant, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); ^[ 140-41 
(Russon, J. dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
1. No precedent permits this Court to invoke its supervisory authority in 
order to exercise jurisdiction in an untimely appeal. 
Whatever parameters might surround this Court's supervisory authority, this Court 
may not invoke it to create jurisdiction where none exists. This Court's appellate jurisdiction 
is determined by statute. Utah Const, art. VIII, § 3 ("The Supreme Court shall have appellate 
jurisdiction over all matters to be exercised as provided by statute"). See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2 (setting forth this Court's appellate jurisdiction). Thus, this Court could not invoke 
its inherent supervisory power to take jurisdiction over an appeal that had not been assigned 
to it by statute. Likewise, as explained, rule 2, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, expressly 
prohibits this Court from suspending the time requirements of rule 4. Thus, this Court clearly 
could not invoke its supervisory authority to nevertheless circumvent those jurisdictional time 
limits. Yet that is what defendant asks this Court to do. By remanding this untimely appeal 
with an order for the district court to resentence defendant, the Court would, in effect, be 
circumventing the time limits in rule 4 by enlarging the time for appeal. This the Court may 
not do. See Johnson, 635 P.2d at 37. 
Significantly, defendant cites no published decision in which this Court exercised its 
supervisory authority to assume jurisdiction where none existed. Indeed, all cases in which 
this Court has invoked its supervisory authority have dealt with what is essentially ad hoc 
rule-making by the Court or oversight of the administration of lower courts. See, e.g., State 
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v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 43 9,442 (Utah 1996) (stating in effective assistance of counsel case 
that "pursuant to our inherent supervisory power over the courts, we may presume prejudice 
in circumstances where it is unnecessary and ill-advised to pursue a case-by-case inquiry to 
weigh actual prejudice"); State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629,650 (Utah 1995) (advising, pursuant 
to inherent supervisory power, that trial courts should be more conservative in ruling on for-
cause challenges to jurors in capital cases); State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 407 n.7 (Utah 
1994) (stating that language changes made in other cases to burden of proof instruction were 
undertaken pursuant to court's supervisory power over lower courts); State v. Thurman, 846 
P.2d 1256, 1266, 1271-72 (Utah 1993) (invoking "inherent supervisory authority over all 
courts of this state" to establish appropriate standards of review); State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 
851, 857 (Utah 1992) (holding, pursuant to court's inherent supervisory power over courts, 
that "counsel with concurrent prosecutorial obligations may not be appointed to defend 
indigent persons"); State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 965 (Utah 1989) (adopting, pursuant 
to court's supervisory power, bifurcated hearing process in simple sexual abuse/aggravated 
sexual abuse cases); State v. James, 767 P.2d 549, 557 (Utah 1989) (invoking court's 
inherent supervisory power over trial courts to adopt bifurcated hearing process in first 
degree murder trials where evidence of prior convictions is introduced); In re Criminal 
Investigations, IthDist. Court No. CS-1, 754 P.2d 633,653 (Utah 1988) (invoking inherent 
supervisory power over judicial branch to require that all criminal investigations under 
Subpoena Powers Act "be fully documented" and that such documentation "be maintained 
by the district court authorizing the investigation"); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,499 (Utah 
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1988) (Zimmerman, J., concurring in result) (noting that requiring trials to proceed in 
bifurcated fashion to prevent evidence of prior convictions in murder trial is "entirely within 
our inherent power to supervise the courts"), overruled in part on other grounds byMenzies, 
889 P.2d at 397-98; State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1260 (Utah 1988) (calling on court's 
inherent supervisory power to impose requirements of instructions and written findings on 
proof of aggravating circumstances in penalty phase of capital case); State ex rel 
Clatterbuck, 700 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1985) (exercising inherent supervisory power to 
require detailed findings and reasons for certifying juveniles to adult court); Hi-Country 
Estates Homeowners Assoc, v. Bagley & Co., 2000 UT 27, f , 996 P.2d 534 (in timely 
interlocutory appeal, exercising "authority to supervise and oversee the administration of the 
lower courts of this state" to review presiding judge's decision in unsigned minute entry to 
reassign case under Utah Code Jud. Admin. Rule 3-104(3)(E) (1999)). 
None of those cases involved this Court invoking its supervisory authority in an 
untimely appeal to remand for resentencing. Rather, the appellant in each of the foregoing 
cases had properly invoked the Court's jurisdiction by filing a timely notice of appeal. 
Defendant acknowledges that Johnson says nothing about the Court's supervisory 
authority, but he nevertheless claims that this Court in effect exercised that authority by 
adopting a new procedure that permitted a criminal defendant to seek resentencing when he 
was denied his right to appeal. Br. Pet. 13-17. Defendant seems to argue that if Johnson 
adopted a new procedural rule that permitted resentencing, this Court may invoke its 
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supervisory authority now to extend that rule to permit an appellate court in an untimely 
appeal to remand for automatic resentencing. 
Johnson, however, did not adopt a new rule of procedure. It simply pointed the 
defendant to an existing procedure—post-conviction proceedings—as a means for proving 
that he was denied his right to appeal and for obtaining relief in the form of resentencing. 
But Johnson does not help defendant's cause for a more fundamental reason. 
Whatever the Johnson court had to say about the correct procedure for resentencing, it did 
not exercise its supervisory authority to remand with an order to resentence defendant. It 
instead properly recognized its jurisdictional limitations over an untimely appeal and it 
dismissed the appeal with the explanation that defendant could seek a remedy with a court 
that would have jurisdiction. Johnson 635 P.2d at 38. In sum, Johnson does not represent 
an exercise of this Court's inherent supervisory authority. Certainly, it does not support 
defendant's claim that this Court may exercise its inherent supervisory power to formulate 
rules that allow it to act outside its jurisdiction.3 
3Defendant spends much of his brief arguing that Johnson permits him to seek 
resentencing by filing a motion in the underlying criminal case instead of by filing a 
separate civil post-conviction petition. Br. Pet. 13-16,23-29. That, however, is not the 
issue before this Court. Defendant has not sought resentencing in the district court. He 
has only sought an appellate remedy. The only question before this Court is whether the 
court of appeals had jurisdiction to grant him that remedy. The notes, however, that the 
question of the appropriate procedure to use in seeking resentencing in the district court is 
currently before this Court in Manning v. State, 2004 UT App 87, 89 P.3d 196, cert, 
granted by 98 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2004). 
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2. Defendant improperly relies on unpublished orders from other appeals to 
support his claims. 
Because no published authority supports his position, defendant resorts to citing to 
unpublished orders issued by this Court: State v. Clark, Case No. 20010819-SC; State v. 
Munford;CaseNo.2Q0lQ4l3-SC;mdStatev. flawaw, Case No. 20020885-SC. Br. Pet. 11. 
According to defendant, these orders support his claim that this Court "may invoke its 
supervisory power to remand for resentencing in a case, even where it lacks jurisdiction over 
an appeal from the convictions." Id. 
The Munford order, issued on 31 July 2001, states: 
The State's motion to dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction is 
granted, but the case is remanded to the trial court for re-sentencing and 
appointment of counsel, so that defendant may perfect his appeal as of right. 
See Br. Pet., Addendum. E. The Clark order was issued approximately six months later on 
17 January 2002. It states: 
The State's motion to dismiss is granted, but the case is remanded to the 
trial court for resentencing, so that defendant may exercise his constitutional 
right to appeal. In remanding the case, this court invokes its supervisory 
powers, where it is obvious from the record that defendant was denied his 
constitutional right to appeal by an attorney who has since been suspended 
from the practice of law and where fundamental values are threatened by other 
modes of proceedings. State v. Bennett, 2000 UT 34, «|j 13, 999 P.2d 1. 
See Br. Pet., Addendum D. The Hassan order, issued on 21 April 2003, states: 
The court denies defendant's motion for order affirming this court's 
jurisdiction over his appeal. The court grants defendant's motion for order 
remanding his case to the trial court for re-sentencing. This court invokes its 
authority to remand the case under section 78-2-2(2) which vests this court 
with "authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its 
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orders, judgments, and decrees." Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(2) (2001). The 
Court denies the State's motion to dismiss the appeal. 
Br. Pet., Addendum F. 
As a threshold matter, defendant's citation to these orders as precedent is improper. 
In Grand County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25, ffif 16-17,44 P.3d 734, this Court held that parties 
could cite to unpublished court of appeals' memorandum decisions "to the degree that they 
are useful, authoritatively and persuasively." Id. at^ 16. In so holding, this Court explained 
that such decisions are "issued and distributed as are all other opinions, except for the fact 
that they are not published in the Utah Advance Reports or the West reporter system." Id. 
Moreover, the court of appeals' memorandum decisions are "generally available to the bar 
and public through the internet service provided by the Administrative Office of the Courts." 
Id. Accordingly, this Court held that such decisions could be "presented as precedential 
authority to a lower court or as persuasive authority to this [C]ourt, so long as all parties and 
the court are supplied with accurate copies at the time the decision is first cited." Id. at 16. 
The Court recognized, however, that the precedential value of memorandum decisions may 
be limited, given the tendency of such decisions to omit procedural and substantive 
background and to forego detailed analysis. Id. at ^[ 16-17. 
Prior to Grand County, the Rules of Judicial Administration expressly prohibited 
parties from citing to unpublished decisions in any state court. Id. at f^ 16 n.4 (citing Utah 
R. Jud. Admin. 4-508). After Grand County, this Court amended its appellate rules to permit 
parties to cite "as precedent" both "[p]ublished decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court 
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of Appeals'5 and "[unpublished decisions," so long as accurate copies of the unpublished 
decisions were provided to all parties and the court. Utah R. App. P. 30(f). Defendant cites 
to rule 30, presumably as authority for citing to these three orders. 
But neither rule 30 nor Grand County support relying on such orders as precedent. 
Rule 30, adopted the year after Grand County was issued, was clearly intended to formally 
incorporate Grand County's new rule into the appellate rules of procedure. Moreover, the 
term "decisions" as used in rule 30 clearly does not contemplate the type of orders that 
defendant cites. The term "decisions" in rule 30 is distinguished by two modifiers: 
"published" and "unpublished." Utah R. App. P. 30(f). Obviously, "published decisions" 
refer to the opinions issued by this Court and the court of appeals that are published in the 
official reporter. See Grand County, 2002 UT 25, \ 7. "Unpublished decisions" then must 
refer to same type of decision, but which is not published in the official reporter. Given the 
context of the term and in light of Grand County, "decision" cannot possibly refer to the kind 
of brief, unpublished orders defendant now cites. 
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine when an unpublished order such as these would have 
any useful precedential value, given that such orders tend to have even less analysis and 
background than unpublished memorandum decisions. None of these orders contains any 
procedural or factual background, nor any supporting analysis or reasoning, although they 
were clearly issued in response to motions to dismiss the appeal. Moreover, while 
unpublished memorandum decisions are made "available to the bar and public through the 
internet service provided by the Administrative Office of the Courts" and on research 
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databases such as WestLaw and Lexis, the orders cited here were not. They were distributed 
only to the parties in the case. Thus, other litigants searching for authority to cite would be 
unable to access these orders. This alone demonstrates that this Court did not intend for 
these orders to have any binding or precedential value for other cases. 
But even if these orders could be properly cited as precedent, they provide no 
guidance as to whether this Court may invoke its supervisory authority in an untimely appeal. 
Neither the Munford nor Hassan orders uses the term "inherent supervisory authority." The 
Clark order is the only one to use that term. But even so, the Clark order provides no 
explanatory background into the basis for the order. Consequently, it contributes nothing to 
the issue here. And, more importantly, to the extent that the Clark order supports defendant's 
argument, it represents a departure from the well-established jurisdictional rules set out in 
published opinions cited above. As such, any possible precedential value is de minimis. 
In sum, this Court's supervisory authority may not be invoked in order to create 
jurisdiction where none exists or to circumvent the jurisdictional time frame for appeal. 
D. The state constitutional and statutory "AH Writs" provisions do not permit an 
appellate court to take any action other than dismissal in an untimely appeal. 
The Utah Constitution grants this Court "appellate jurisdiction over all other matters 
to be exercised as provided by statute" and "power to issue all writs and orders necessary for 
the exercise of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction or the complete determination of any cause." 
Utah Const, art. VIII, § 3. Statute also grants this Court "jurisdiction to issue all 
extraordinary writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
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its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction." Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 
(West 2004). Statute likewise grants the court of appeals jurisdiction "to issue all 
extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary: (a) to carry into effect its 
judgments, orders, and decrees; or (b) in aid of its jurisdiction." Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(1) (West 2004). 
1. Neither this Court nor the court of appeals may issue a writ "in aid o f 
non-existent jurisdiction. 
In the court of appeals, defendant argued that the court could remand for resentencing 
by issuing a writ under the "in aid of its jurisdiction" provision of section 78-2a-3(l)(b). See 
Cox, 2004 UT App 277, at 2. Defendant renews that claim here. 
The court of appeals stated in response to defendant's argument that the authority 
granted under subsection (l)(b) "presumes that this court has appropriate jurisdiction" and 
"does not confer jurisdiction where this court does not otherwise have it because of an 
untimely notice of appeal." Id. 
The court of appeals' reading of that statutory provision is correct. The phrase "in aid 
of its jurisdiction" by its terms presupposes that the court already has jurisdiction over the 
matter. Otherwise, a writ could not be "in aid of'jurisdiction. This reading is supported by 
federal decisions interpreting a similar phrase in federal statutes. For example, in United 
States v. Crockett, 861 A.2d 604, 610 (D.C. 2004), the court held that "in aid of their 
respective jurisdictions" in 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) does not "create an independent basis for 
jurisdiction where the court otherwise had none." The United States Supreme Court likewise 
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interpreted the phrase "in aid of its jurisdiction" in 28 U.S.C. § 2283, to presuppose 
jurisdiction in the first place. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive 
Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281,294 (1970) (holding that, "if the District Court does have jurisdiction, 
it is not enough that the requested injunction is related to that jurisdiction, but it must be 
'necessary in aid of that jurisdiction"). See also James v. X. Bellotti, 733 F.2d 989, 993 (1st 
Cir. 1984) ("[T]he district court's jurisdiction to issue an injunction under the [in aid of its 
jurisdiction] exception[] in section 2283 is ancillary to its jurisdiction in the underlying 
case"); In re Diet Drugs Products Liability Litigation, 369 F.3d 293, 306 (3rd Cir. 2004) 
(federal district court, pursuant to its authority to issue injunctions that are necessary in aid 
of its jurisdiction, may enjoin state court action that if allowed, would "run afoul" of a 
settlement agreement that the federal court retained exclusive jurisdiction over); Signal 
Properties, Inc. v. Farha, et. al., 482 F.2d 1136, 1140 (5th Cir. 1973) ("[T]he district court 
should be able to issue an injunction in aid of its jurisdiction to prevent the [state] court from 
continuing multiplicitous proceedings, from rendering a decision which could effectively 
deprive the federal court of its in rem jurisdiction through principles of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel, or from rendering a decision potentially inconsistent with a decision of 
the federal district court"); Krahm v. Graham, 461 F.2d 703, 708-09 (9th Cir. 1972) 
("[Section] 2283 is a limitation on the exercise by the federal courts of their equitable 
jurisdiction, but is not a jurisdictional statute"); Tyler v. Russel, 410 F.2d 490,491 (10th Cir. 
1969) ("Section 2283 is not a jurisdictional statute but rather a limitation upon the exercise 
by a district court of its equity jurisdiction"); Henson v. Hoth, 258 F. Supp. 33,35 (D. Colo. 
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1996) (The phrase, "in aid of its jurisdiction" in 28 U.S.C. § 2283 "refers only to jurisdiction 
which has already attached, it cannot be considered an original jurisdictional grant"). 
Defendant relies on Barnard v. Murphy, 882 P.2d 679, 681 (Utah App. 1994) 
("Barnard IF) to support his argument that an appellate court may issue a writ "in aid of its 
jurisdiction," even when it lacks jurisdiction. Br. Pet. 19-20. Barnard II, however, is 
inapposite because it involved an original writ proceeding. Barnard, a lawyer, had moved 
the trial judge to recuse himself from several cases in which Barnard represented a party. Id. 
at 680-81. As required by rule, the trial judge certified one affidavit to another judge, but 
took no action in the other cases. Id. Barnard petitioned the court of appeals for 
extraordinary relief in the nature of mandamus. Barnard v. Murphy, 852 P.2d 1023, 1024 
(Utah App. 1993) ("Barnard7"). The court of appeals granted the writ and ordered the trial 
judge to immediately comply with the applicable rule on judicial disqualification. Id. at 
1025. The trial judge then referred all but two of the affidavits to another judge. Id. 
In BarnardII, Barnard petitioned the court of appeals for another extraordinary writ, 
also in the nature of mandamus, ordering the trial judge to comply with the rule in the last 
two cases. 882 P.2d at 681. The petition also asked the court to direct the trial judge's 
recusal from all cases in which Barnard filed an affidavit of bias. Id. 
The court of appeals held in BarnardII that it had jurisdiction over the second petition 
for extraordinary relief under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(l)(a), which grants that court "all 
writs and process necessary: (a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees." Id. 
at 681. The court of appeals reasoned that since it had already ordered the trial judge to 
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comply with the disqualification rule in the respective cases, issuing the second writ "would 
only be "carry[ing] into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees." Id. In other words, the 
court of appeals "could properly issue a writ to enforce [its] prior order." Id. 
The Barnard II court then went on to hold that it also had jurisdiction to issue the 
second writ under the "in aid of jurisdiction" provision. Id. The court reasoned that because 
it had general appellate jurisdiction over the subject matter of the cases at issue—i.e., divorce 
cases—the writ could properly issue "in aid of its jurisdiction," "even if no appeal is 
pending." Id. 
A pending appeal was unnecessary to invoke the court of appeals' jurisdiction in 
Barnard II, however, because its jurisdiction had been invoked by an original writ 
proceedings. Because of the court of appeals has original appellate jurisdiction over divorce 
cases, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h), there was no question that it, not this Court, was 
the appropriate court for seeking extraordinary relief in the nature of mandamus. 
In this case, defendant did not attempt to invoke the writ jurisdiction of either 
appellate court through an original writ proceeding. Rather, he unsuccessfully tried to invoke 
the this Court's appellate jurisdiction by filing an untimely notice of appeal. Thus, while the 
Barnard II court had underlying jurisdiction over the original writ proceeding, the court of 
appeal never had jurisdiction over defendant's untimely appeal. Thus, the court of appeals 
could not issue a writ "in aid of its non-existent jurisdiction. 
Boggess v. Morris, 635 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981) ("Boggess 11% on the other hand, is a 
perfect example of a writ issued "in aid of an appellate court's jurisdiction. Boggess was 
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issued on the same day as Johnson. Boggess, like Johnson, had initially filed an untimely 
notice ofappeal from his manslaughter conviction. Id. at 40. Boggess filed a habeas petition 
in the district court alleging that he had timely asked his counsel to appeal, but that his 
counsel had failed to file a notice ofappeal. Id. at 40-41. After taking evidence, the district 
court found Boggess's allegations to be true and ruled that he "had been denied his right to 
appeal and his right to counsel." Id. at 40. In an attempt to afford Boggess relief, the district 
court entered an order granting him "permission to file an out-of-time appeal and directing 
him to return to the district court for further relief if this Court refused to entertain that 
appeal." Id. 
Without addressing the merits of Boggess's claims, this Court dismissed the untimely 
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. State v. Boggess, 601 P.2d 927 (Utah 1979) ^ Boggess F). 
Accordingly, Boggess returned to the district court for habeas relief. Boggess II, 635 P.2d 
at 40-41. The district court ordered that if this Court did not take jurisdiction "of the 
substantive merits of an appeal by [Boggess] within thirty (30) days," it would grant 
Boggess's habeas petition and release him from prison." Id. at 41. Thirty days later, the 
district court vacated defendant's conviction and released him from custody, with the 
understanding that the State could reprosecute Boggess. Id. The State timely appealed the 
order granting habeas relief. Id. 
Citing to Johnson, this Court explained that ordinarily a defendant denied his right to 
appeal should seek resentencing through post-conviction proceedings. Id. at 42. The Court 
noted, however, "the unusual circumstances of this case, where the facts [had] already been 
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established by findings in a habeas corpus proceeding." Id. Under these circumstances, the 
Court stated, "it would be needlessly circular to require that defendant return to the district 
court to re-establish the facts by a postconviction hearing and then to be resentenced to 
qualify for a direct appeal." Id. 
This Court noted that while Boggess's criminal conviction was "no longer subject to 
review by the statutory remedy of appeal," the habeas proceeding was properly before the 
Court on appeal. Id. at 43. "In that circumstance, where this Court has appellate jurisdiction 
over the habeas corpus proceeding and original jurisdiction to issue the writ of certiorari for 
the record in the criminal conviction, the effect of the two writs can unite to open the door 
for direct review of a criminal conviction in this Court." Id. In other words, where this 
Court already had appellate jurisdiction over the habeas proceeding, it could issue a writ of 
certiorari in aid of that jurisdiction to provide Boggess with relief. See also State v. Hallett, 
856 P.2d 1060,1061-62 (Utah 1993) (approving court of appeals' use of Boggess procedure 
in nearly identical circumstances). 
This Court cautioned, however, that this procedure was not "available as an alternate 
means of review." Id. Otherwise, "these two writs could make a mockery of the time limits 
for appeal, undermine the finality of criminal judgments, and promote the indefensible 
merry-go-round of collateral attack." Id. 
Moreover, it is significant that the remedy in Boggess was neither offered nor afforded 
Johnson. This is because this Court lacked appellate jurisdiction over Johnson's appeal and 
because Johnson had not yet established the factual allegations that would entitle him to 
31 
resentencing. Defendant's circumstances here mirror Johnson's, not Boggess's. Like the 
Johnson court, this Court lacks jurisdiction over defendant's untimely appeal. And unlike 
the Boggess court, this Court has no appellate jurisdiction over a habeas proceeding. Thus, 
this Court should grant defendant the same remedy that it granted Johnson: dismissal of the 
untimely appeal with the advice thai defendant seek a resentencing order in postconviction 
proceedings in the district court. 
2. Defendant's argument that this Court has independent jurisdiction to 
issue a writ to order resentencing is unpreserved. 
For the first time before this Court, defendant argues that this Court has power to issue 
a writ "independent of appellate jurisdiction over a case." Br. Pet. 17. Defendant neither 
raised this argument in the court of appeals, see Add. C, nor in his petition for certiorari 
review. Rather, he argued only that the court of appeals had authority to remand with an 
order of resentencing pursuant to its statutory writ power "in aid of its jurisdiction." He 
should not be permitted at this late date to raise this new appellate claim, which is not fairly 
included in his petition for certiorari review. 
In any event, the fact that both this Court and the court of appeals have the authority 
to issue extraordinary writs independent of their appellate jurisdiction does not aid defendant. 
First, defendant did not invoke the court of appeals' statutory authority to issue a writ for 
extraordinary relief. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3. Rather, he asked only for a writ "in aid 
o f the court of appeals' jurisdiction. But even if defendant had sought extraordinary relief, 
it would not have been available to him. Extraordinary writs have always been available only 
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when "no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available." See Utah R. Civ. P. 65B. 
See also Osborne v. Adoption Center of Choice, 2003 UT 15, \ 24, 70 P.3d 58. Here, 
defendant had a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy—an appeal. See Commercial Security 
Bank v. Phillips, 655 P.2d 678, 679-80 (Utah 1982) (plaintiffs who did not exercise right to 
appeal district court's adverse ruling could not substitute that "plain, speedy and adequate 
remedy at law" with petition for extraordinary relief). Also, as held by Johnson, defendant 
has an plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law in the form of post-conviction proceedings 
seeking resentencing.4 
E. Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is not a mechanism for an appellate 
court to order relief from an untimely appeal. 
Defendant argues that rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure "would accommodate 
a request for relief under the circumstances here." Br. Pet. 31. Assuming for the sake of 
argument, but not conceding that this rule of civil procedure even applies in criminal 
proceedings, defendant has not explained how this rule may be invoked for the first time in 
the appellate court in an untimely appeal. As the court of appeals stated, rule 60(b) is a rule 
of civil procedure "to be invoked in the trial court." Cox, 2004 UT 277, at 2 (emphasis 
added). "It is not appropriate to bring a motion under rule 60(b) in [an appellate] court for 
4Defendant also failed to follow the correct procedures for invoking either this 
Court's or the court of appeals' authority to issue an extraordinary writ. Extraordinary 
relief procedures are governed by rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Osborne, 
2003 UT 15, <[ 23. That rule requires that a separate petition seeking relief be filed. Utah 
R. Civ. P. 65B. Defendant here filed no petition for extraordinary relief. He merely 
argued in his untimely appeal that the court of appeals should act outside its jurisdiction 
and grant him relief. Moreover, it is unclear whether defendant could establish any of the 
grounds for relief set forth in rule 65B. 
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the first time." Id. Indeed, the State knows of no authority that permits an appellant to bring 
such a motion in the appellate count, even when the court's jurisdiction has been properly 
invoked. It defies reason to assume that an appellate court would have jurisdiction to grant 
rule 60(b) motion in an untimely appeal over which the court lacks jurisdiction. 
F. Good policy does not support an appellate court acting outside its jurisdiction. 
Defendant finally argues that policy supports remand for resentencing because "it 
conserves resources, it is fundamentally fair, and it does not prejudice the State." Br. Pet. 
37. 
As a threshold matter, a court may not act outside its jurisdiction no matter how many 
policy considerations argue for it to do so. And acting without jurisdiction is always bad 
policy. As explained in the beginning of this argument, the court of appeals lacked 
jurisdiction over defendant's untimely appeal and, accordingly, had power only to dismiss 
the appeal. Thus, defendant's policy arguments are irrelevant to the question at hand. 
But defendant's policy arguments are also incorrect. First, it does not necessarily 
conserve resources for an appellate court to remand the case with an order to the district court 
to resentence the defendant. Whether the appellate court issues a remand or requires the 
defendant to seek an order of resentencing in the district court, the case has to be sent back 
to the district court for the resentencing. If the case must go back to the district court in 
either case, it is little more trouble for the defendant to file a petition in the district court 
seeking resentencing relief. Indeed, defendant here is represented by able counsel who can 
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file a simple petition that will take far less time to prepare than has the appellate briefing 
already submitted on the issue. 
Moreover, whether a defendant is entitled to resentencing is, as Johnson noted, a 
factual issue better suited to resolution in the trial court. Johnson, 635 P.2d at 38-39. If, as 
defendant claims, the record obviously demonstrates that he was denied his right to appeal 
due to his counsel's ineffectiveness, he should have no problem establishing that fact to the 
district court. Indeed, the State routinely stipulates to the grant of a post-conviction petition 
and resentencing when the record facts indisputably demonstrate that the defendant was 
denied his right to appeal. Also, in obvious cases, there is no reason why the post-conviction 
petition and resentencing hearings cannot be scheduled at the same time. 
Second, requiring defendant to seek a resentencing order in the district court is not 
fundamentally unfair. As stated, the procedure is simple and in obvious cases can be 
expedited. Moreover, fundamental unfairness is more likely to result under defendant's 
proposed procedure. As explained above, this Court has often dismissed the untimely 
appeals of criminal defendants who are in the same position as defendant. See Jiminez, 938 
P.2d at 264; Bowers, 2002 UT 100; Putnik, 2002 UT 122. The record facts in those cases 
were no less obvious than this case in demonstrating that their appeals were lost due to their 
counsel's procedural missteps. Yet this Court did not remand with an order to resentence 
them. It instead dismissed each case for lack of jurisdiction. Defendant asks that his case 
be given preferential treatment. 
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This Court has observed, however, that it is unjust to afford preferential treatment to 
some defendants, but not others: 
[G]iven the fact that we have routinely dismissed appeals that were improperly 
taken, even after briefing and argument, we bear a heavy burden of 
justification when we single out one improperly taken appeal for preferential 
treatment that has been denied so many others. The essence of justice is to 
treat similar cases similarly. Until we can explain persuasively why any one 
case deserves treatment denied to others, we should deny extraordinary 
treatment. 
A.J. Mackay Co. v. Okland Construction Co., Inc.,, 817 P.2d 323, 325-26 (Utah 1991) 
(citations omitted).5 
Defendant advances no reason why he should be granted preferential treatment over 
all other defendants who have filed untimely appeals because of their counsel's 
ineffectiveness. Indeed, it makes little sense to have one jurisdictional rule for those cases 
in which it appears obvious that counsel was ineffective and those in which it is not so 
obvious. As a practical matter, such a line would be difficult to draw objectively. One case 
might appear obvious to one person, but would not necessarily appear obvious to another. 
This leads to defendant's final claim that remanding for automatic sentencing would 
not prejudice the State. As stated, the State often stipulates to the grant of a post-conviction 
petition and resentencing when a defendant demonstrates that he was denied his right to 
5A. J. Mackay involved a civil appeal that was improperly certified under rule 
54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Holding that an appellate court lacks jurisdiction 
over appeals improperly certified under rule 54(b), this Court noted that in "extraordinary 
cases" it could "choose to treat a purported [appellate rule 3 appeal of right] as an 
interlocutory appeal under [appellate rule 5]." Id. at 325. It declined to do so in A. J. 
Mackay, however, because the Court would have denied a petition for interlocutory 
review. Id. at 326. 
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appeal because of his counsel's ineffectiveness. The State will not stipulate to resentencing, 
however, when a defendant consciously foregoes his right to appeal by pleading guilty or 
instructing his counsel not to file a notice of appeal. Allowing a defendant to circumvent 
post-conviction proceedings in the district court deprives the State of the opportunity to 
dispute or test defendant's factual allegations that he was denied his right to appeal through 
the fault of counsel. 
The situation in Manning v. State, 2004 UT App 87, 89 P.3d 196, cert, granted by, 98 
P.3d 1177 (Utah 2004), illustrates this point. Manning filed an untimely notice of appeal 
from her conviction and sentence entered on her guilty pleas. Id. As defendant does here, 
Manning argued that court of appeals should not dismiss her untimely appeal; rather the court 
should simply remand with directions to the district court to resentence her. See State v. 
Manning, 2002 UT App 114 (unpublished memorandum decision) (attached at Addendum 
D). The court of appeals refused, stating that since it lacked jurisdiction over the untimely 
appeal, it had no authority to do anything but dismiss. Id. 
Manning subsequently filed a post-conviction petition in the district court, claiming 
that she was denied her right to appeal due to her counsel's ineffectiveness. Manning v. 
State, 2004 UT App, \ 7. The State disputed that claim and after holding a hearing, the 
district court found that rather than being denied her right to appeal, Manning had merely 
chosen not to exercise that right. Id.. Accordingly, the district court held that Manning was 
not entitled to resentencing under Johnson, See id. The court of appeals affirmed that ruling 
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and the case is currently under submission before this Court on a writ of certiorari. Id. at f 
35. 
The point is that if the court of appeals had granted Manning's original request to 
remand for automatic resentencing, the State would have been deprived of its right to dispute 
the claim that Manning was entitled to be resentenced. Moreover, while it may appear 
obvious on some records that a defendant has been denied her right to appeal, the reality is 
that there are often conflicting extra-record facts that the appellate court will be unaware of. 
Thus, it will be impossible for an appellate court to always determine which cases warrant 
resentencing and which cases do not. Consequently, the only way to ensure fair and even-
handed treatment for both the State and all defendants is to require the procedure set out in 
Johnson in all cases—i.e, dismiss the untimely appeal and allow the defendant to pursue any 
resentencing remedy in the district court. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should affirm the court of appeals' order dismissing defendant's untimely 
appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ( day of . 2005. 
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Attorneys: Linda M. Jones, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Laura B. Dupaix, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Davis, and Jackson. 
PER CURIAM: 
This case is before the court on this court's motion as well 
as the State's motion for summary dismissal for lack of 
jurisdiction. See Utah R. App. P. 10. The summary dismissal 
motion was based on an untimely notice of appeal. Appellant Cox 
was convicted by a jury. The Sentence, Judgment, and Commitment 
issued December 8, 2003. Cox filed a motion for a new trial on 
December 5, 2003, prior to sentencing and issuance of the final 
judgment. The trial court issued findings denying Cox's motion 
for a new trial on March 11, 2004. Cox filed his notice of 
appeal on April 8, 2004. Because the motion for a new trial was 
filed prior to sentencing and issuance of the final judgment, the 
motion was premature and, therefore, untimely. See Utah R. Crim. 
P. 24(c). As a result, the motion did not toll the time for 
filing the notice of appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 4(b); State v. 
Putnik, 2002 UT 122,^5, 63 P.3d 91. The notice of appeal, filed 
within thirty days of the order denying the motion for a new 
trial, rather than thirty days from the final judgment, is 
untimely. See State v. Todd, 20 04 UT App 26 6; State v. Putnik, 
2002 UT at |^5. When a notice of appeal is untimely filed, this 
court lacks jurisdiction to do anything other than dismiss the 
action. See Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 
(Utah Ct. App. 198 9). 
direct appeal as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
See Johnson, 635 P.2d at 38. 
Cox argues that a motion under the Post-Conviction Remedies 
Act would not be feasible for him because of his pro se status 
and the lack of resources available to him at the prison. Cox 
also argues that proceeding under the Post-Conviction Remedies 
Act would not be a speedy remedy. However, the trial court has 
the authority to appoint counsel on a pro bono basis for purposes 
of a post conviction petition if the petition is not summarily 
dismissed. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-109 (2002). Moreover, 
the fact that the process of litigating a post-conviction 
petition takes time does not allow this court to assume 
jurisdiction of an appeal not properly before it. 
Accordingly, this appeal is summarily dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
Russell W. Bench, 
Assoc; ^ res id ing Judge 
Norman H. Jackson Jiidgi" 
ADDENDUM B 
Constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules 
Utah Constitution, art. V I I I 
Sec. 3. [Jurisdiction of Supreme Court] 
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to answer 
questions of state law certified by a court of the United States. The Supreme Court shall have 
appellate jurisdiction over all other matters to be exercised as provided by statute, and power to 
issue all writs and orders necessary for the exercise of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction or the 
complete determination of any cause. 
Sec. 4. [Rulemaking power of Supreme Court—Judges pro tempore—Regulation 
of practice of law] 
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used in the courts of the 
state and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The Legislature may amend the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members 
of both houses of the Legislature. Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, the Supreme 
Court by rule may authorize retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to perform any 
judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the United States, Utah residents, and 
admitted to practice law in Utah. The Supreme Court by rule shall govern the practice of law, 
including admission to practice law and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to 
practice law. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-2-2 
§ 78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state law certified by a 
court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and authority to 
issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments, and decrees or 
in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, 
over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to final judgment by 
the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; 
(v) the state engineer; or 
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources reviewing actions of the 
Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of 
agencies under Subsection (3)(e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of the United States or 
this state unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the United States or the Utah 
Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a first degree or 
capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or 
capital felony; 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals 
does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and 
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees ruling on legislative 
subpoenas. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over which the 
Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a court of record 
involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and 
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari 
for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall review those 
cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, 
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-2a-3 
§ 78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs 
and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory 
appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state 
agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the 
agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and 
Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions 
reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, 
and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local 
agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction or 
charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are 
incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge 
to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of 
the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited 
to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time, visitation, 
adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of the court 
may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and determination any matter 
over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, 
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
Utah Rules App.Proc. 
RULE 2. SUSPENSION OF RULES 
In the interest of expediting a decision, the appellate court, on its own motion or for 
extraordinary cause shown, may, except as to the provisions of Rules 4(a), 4(b), 4(e), 5(a), 48, 
52, and 59, suspend the requirements or provisions of any of these rules in a particular case and 
may order proceedings in that case in accordance with its direction. 
RULE 4. APPEAL AS OF RIGHT: WHEN TAKEN 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a 
matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the 
judgment or order appealed from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory 
forcible entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed 
with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order 
appealed from. 
(b) Motions post j udgmen t or order- If a timely motion under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under 
Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the 
judgment would be required if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the 
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all parties shall run from 
the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion. 
Similarly, if a timely motion is filed in the trial court (1) for a new trial under Rule 24 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure,; or (2) to withdraw a plea under Utah Code Ann § 77-13-6, the 
time for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or 
granting or denying the motion to withdraw the plea. A notice of appeal filed before the 
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of appeal must be filed 
within the prescribed time measured from the entry of the order of the trial court disposing of 
the motion as provided above. 
( c j H img prior to entry of j udgmen t or order. Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this 
rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a decision, judgment, or order but before 
the entry of the judgment or order of the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and 
on the day thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, any other party 
may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date on which the first notice of appeal was 
filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last 
expires. 
(e ) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good 
cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later than 30 days 
after the expiration of the time prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before 
expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires. 
Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given to the other parties 
in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. No extension shall exceed 30 days past 
the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of the order granting the motion, 
whichever occurs later. 
( f ) Appeal by an Inmate Confined in an Institution. If an inmate confined in an institution 
files a notice of appeal in either a civil or criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely filed if it is 
deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing 
may be shown by a notarized statement or written declaration setting forth the date of deposit 
and stating that first-class postage has been prepaid. If a notice of appeal is filed in the manner 
provided in this paragraph (f), the 14-day period provided in paragraph (d) runs from the date 
when the trial court receives the first notice of appeal. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE ()1 UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
ROBERT ELLIS COX, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO TEMPORARILY RE-
MAND THIS CASE TO THE TRIAL 
COURT FOR RESENTENCING; AND 
IN OPPOSITION TO THE SUA 
SPONTE MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION, AND TO THE 
STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No. 20040300-CA 
This Memorandum is in response to the Sua Sponte Motion for Summary Dispo-
sition and the State's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Also, it is in support of 
Appellant Robert Cox's motion for resentencing. Cox requests that this Court tem-
porarily remand this case for resentencing so that he may file a timely notice of appeal. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
In lower court proceedings, the state charged Cox by Information with nine sexual 
offenses against a child. A jury convicted Cox as charged, and on December 8, 2003, the 
trial court imposed a combination of consecutive and concuirent sentences and entered 
judgment against Cox. On December 5, 2003, prior to sentencing and judgment, counsel 
for Cox filed a motion for a new trial. The state opposed the motion and on March 11, 
2004, the trial court entered findings of facts, conclusions of law, and an order denying 
the motion. On April 8, 2004, Cox filed a notice of appeal. 
This Court maintains it lacks jurisdiction over the appeal where the new trial 
motion "was premature and untimely" and did not "toll the time for filing a notice of 
appeal." (Sua Sponte Motion, May 12, 2004.) The state asserts the same. (State's Motion 
to Dismiss, April 30, 2004.) The state has asked this Court to dismiss the appeal, fid.) 
Yet, a remedy exists for Cox. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(l)(b) (2002); 
the unpublished decisions of the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Hassan . Case No. 
20020885-SC; State v. Clark. Case No. 20010819-SC; and State v. Munford . 20010413-
SC;1 and Rule 60,Utah R. Civ. P., this Court may temporarily remand this case to the trial 
court with directions to resentence Cox in order that he may properly perfect the appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
THE CONSTITUTION ENTITLES A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT TO A 
DIRECT APPEAL. WHERE COX'S RIGHT TO APPEAL WAS COMPRO-
MISED THROUGH NO FAULT OF HIS OWN, COX IS ENTITLED TO THE 
PROCEDURAL REMEDY OF RESENTENCING IN THE LOWER COURT . 
The Utah Constitution provides that M[i]n criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have . . . the right to appeal in all cases.11 Utah Const, art. I, § 12. In State v. Tuttle, 713 
P.2d 703 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court stated that the right of appeal is essential 
to a fair proceeding. "Rights guaranteed by our state constitution are to be carefully 
protected by the courts. We will not permit them to be lightly forfeited." Id. at 704; 
1
 The unpublished decisions of the Utah Supreme Court in Hassan , Case No. 
20020885-SC, Clark. Case No. 20010819-SC, and Munford. 20010413-SC, are attached 
hereto as Addenda A, B, and C, respectively. See Utah R. App. 30(f) (2004). 
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see Manning v. State. 2004 UT App 87, ^ 9,496 Utah Adv. Rep. 26. If defendant has 
been denied the right to appeal, Utah law recognizes that "in certain limited circumstan-
ces a defendant should be resentenced in order to revive [that] right." Manning, 2004 
UT App 87, [^10. Cox's circumstances support resentencing, as further :^i !l>rtb /:\-:•:: 
A. In Manning this Court Reiterated the Procedural Remedy of Resentencing . 
In Manning, 2004 UT App 87, this Court considered the procedures available to a 
criminal defendant who has failed to perfect an appeal within the time limits set forth in 
the rules Fhere, Manning entered a guilty plea 1= > "one coi nit of i mlawfi ll dealing wit! I 
property by a fiduciary, a second degree felony; one count of failing to file a proper tax 
return, a third degree felony; and one count of theft, a third degree felony." Id_ at [^2. In 
connection with the plea, Manning "acknowledged that by entering a guilty plea she was 
waiving certain rights, including her right to appeal the coi lvictioi i " Id at "p. 
"On September 27, 2001, Manning was sentenced." Id_ at ^ [5. 
On November 23, 2001, Manning filed a pro se notice of appeal, which this court 
later dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. In an unpublished decision, this court 
explained that when a notice of appeal is filed beyond the 30-day appeal deadline, 
see Utah R. App. P. 4(a), we lack appellate jurisdiction, and Manning's only 
remedy if she was deprived of the right to appeal was to seek postconviction relief 
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Id, at TJ6. Manning returned to the lower court and filed a petition pursuant to Rules 
65B(b) and 65C, Utah R. Civ. P., requesting "to be sentenced nunc pro tunc" in order to 
"extend[] tl le time in "< vhich to file a notice of appeal." Id. at %1. The trial court denied 
the petition. IdL In the recently published opinion, this Court affirmed It n lied tl lat 
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Manning would not be entitled to be resentenced. This Court stated, "If a defendant 
knows of her right to appeal but voluntarily chooses to forego it, a change of heart after 
the 30-day period for filing an appeal does not entitle her to be resentenced." IcL at [^24. 
This Court then elaborated on when a criminal defendant may be entitled to resen-
tencing, and when the defendant may be allowed a remedy under Rule 65C of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Post-Conviction Remedies Act ("PCRA"). 
Specifically, in Manning, this Court recognized that "in circumstances where the 
right to appeal has been denied, the trial court may resentence a criminal defendant nunc 
pro tunc to provide the defendant with an opportunity to file a timely appeal." IcL at [^9 
(citing Boggess v. Morris, 635 P.2d 39, 43 (Utah 1981)). According to the Court, 
Both [the state and Manning] agree that if a defendant who wishes to appeal is 
denied that right — by an attorney who fails to file a notice of appeal or, say, a 
prison official who refuses to mail to an attorney a defendant's instructions to file 
an appeal—the defendant should be resentenced to resurrect the right to appeal. 
Id. at TJ24. Also, the state admitted that if a defendant affirmatively seeks to exercise the 
right to appeal, and the right has been denied as a result of the inaction of counsel, or due 
to an interference in the criminal justice system, the defendant should be resentenced. IcL 
Yet, "resentencing" does not require compliance with Rule 65C and the PCRA. 
To explain, the PCRA "establishes a substantive legal remedy for any person who 
challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense and who has exhausted all 
other legal remedies, including a direct appeal." Manning, 2004 UT App 187, \\ 5 (cite 
omitted). The substantive legal remedies under the PCRA include "post-conviction relief 
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to vacate or modify the conviction or sentence." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-104(1) 
(2002). In addition, the PCRA "does not apply" to "petitions that do not challenge a 
conviction or sentence for a criminal offense." Utah Code Ann ' 78-35a-102(2)(a). ' 
Resentencing is not a substantive remedy. It is procedural. A defendant who seeks 
resentencing to perfect a direct appeal is not seeking to "vacate or modify the conviction 
or sentence" (Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-35a-102(2)(a), -104(1)) at that juncture. Resenten-
cing contemplates reimposition of a sentence already imposed so as to afford a defendant 
the opportunity of "perfecting an appeal, since the time for taking such appeal would date 
from the rendition of the new judgment." State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981). 
It is an efficient, limited remedy. The door of resentencing does not swing open in the 
trial court for a substantive challenge on the conviction or sentence. See State v. Hallett 
856 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Utah 1993) (once a court determines that defendant was denied an 
appeal, a direct appeal is immediately provided without deciding other claims). 
In addition, where a person has been denied his right to appeal, he may not be 
allowed the substantive remedies available under the PCRA , I d Ii idee -d, before a person 
may be allowed such remedies, he must "exhaust[] all other legal remedies, including a 
direct appeal." Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-35a-102(l), -106, 108(1) (2002).2 Where a 
person has been "denied" a direct appeal due to an occurrence that is not his fault, s_ee_ 
2
 According to Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-102(l), the PCRA establishes a substantive 
remedy in cases involving criminal offenses "except as provided in Subsection (2).M 
Under Subsection (2), the chapter does not apply to petitions that "do not challenge a 
conviction or sentence in a criminal matter." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-102(2)(a). 
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Manning, 2004 UT App 87, ffl}24-25, that person has not yet exhausted his direct appeal. 
Thus, his remedy is immediate resentencing. Hallett 856 P.2d at 1062. 
B. A Defendant May Be Resentenced in the Trial Court Under This Court's 
Authority Pursuant to § 78-2a-3(l)(b) or Rule 60(b). 
When a defendant's right to appeal is compromised due to the malfeasance/defi-
ciency of counsel, defendant is entitled to a procedural remedy in order to protect the 
right to appeal. Specifically, this Court may temporarily remand the case for resen-
tencing pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(l)(b), or Rule 60(b)(6), Utah R. Civ. P. 
Section 78-2a-3(l)(b) gives this Court jurisdiction to issue any process necessary 
"in aid of its jurisdiction." Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(l)(b) (2002). The Utah Supreme 
Court has invoked a similar provision to ensure that the right to appeal as guaranteed by 
the Utah constitution is adequately protected. See. KL at § 78-2-2(2). 
In State v. Hassan, Case No. 20020885-SC, defendant filed a premature new trial 
motion, resulting in an untimely notice of appeal. To remedy the untimely filing, the 
Utah Supreme Court relied on its authority under § 78-2-2(2) to remand the case to the 
trial court for resentencing in order that the defendant may properly perfect his appeal. 
See Addendum A, hereto; Clark. Case No. 20010819-SC, Addendum B; Munford, 
20010413-SC, Addendum C. This Court may do the same. 
This Court has ruled that its authority to enter orders in aid of its jurisdiction is 
equal to the authority of the Utah Supreme Court. In Barnard v. Murphy. 882 P.2d 679 
(Utah App. 1994) ("Barnard II"), an attorney filed a writ with this Court against a trial 
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judge, who failed to comply with the recusal procedures in Morris v. Morris. a divorce 
case, among others. The writ was prompted by the fact that this Court had ordered the 
judge in a previous matter to comply with the procedures. See id at 681. The trial judge 
waited until shortly before oral argument in Barnard II to comply with tl le procedures ii 1 
Morris. Id. No appeal was pending in Morris. Notwithstanding, this Court relied on its 
authority under § 78-2a-3(l)(a), (b) to address recusal. Id. at 681-82. 
This Court reasoned that where Utah law has provided this Court with subject 
matter jurisdiction over Morris v. Morris, "we have authority to issue necessary writs iii 
connection with that case even if no appeal is pending." Barnard II. 882 P.2d at 681; 
see Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(l)(a) and (2). This Court stated the following: 
[T]his court's more generally phrased writ jurisdiction is apparently as broad as 
the "original" writ jurisdiction bestowed upon the Supreme Court. In crafting the 
jurisdictional language for the Court of Appeals, it is possible the Legislature 
chose more general terminology to ensure this court's ability to issue extraordinary 
writs in any case within the scope of our jurisdiction, whether the case fell within 
our original appellate jurisdiction or was transferred to us by the Supreme Court. 
Barnard II. 882 P.2d at 682. 
Barnard II is relevant here. Where the Utah Supreme Court has applied its 
companion provision (§ 78-2-2(2)) to order resentencing in cases where, for example, the 
new trial motion was premature, see Addendum A, this Court may do the same. Barnard 
II, 82 P.2d at 682 (recognizing that even for cases transferred from the supreme court, 
this Court may invoke its jurisdictional powers under § 78-2a-3(l)). Thus, Cox requests 
that this Court invoke its authority to issue any process in aid of its jurisdiction under § 
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78-2a-3(l)(b), and temporarily remand this case with directions to resentence Cox. 
In the alternative, this Court may temporarily remand this case for resentencing 
under the civil rules. See Utah R. Civ. P. 1(a), 81(e) (2004). Specifically, pursuant to 
Rule 60(b), a party may request relief from a final judgment for any reason "justifying 
relief and "upon such terms as are just." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) (2004).3 
In this case, where Cox may be denied his right to appeal due to trial counsel's 
failure to file a timely notice (see infra, subpart C, herein), Rule 60(b)(6) operates to pro-
vide limited relief from the judgment. See. Stewart v. Sullivan, 506 P.2d 74, 75-76 (Utah 
1973) (stating that Rule 60(b)(7) - now 60(b)(6) - is sufficiently broad to permit the 
court to set aside an order where counsel was incompetent and the opposing party was 
not unduly prejudiced); State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041, 1044 and n. 3 (Utah App. 1994) 
(applying the provision of Rule 60(b) that "most benefits" the party seeking relief). That 
is, due to trial counsel's malfeasance, Cox may be relieved from judgment, then resen-
tenced nunc pro tunc so that he may perfect a proper appeal. Such terms would be just 
and ensure Cox's right to appeal. See. Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6); Utah Const, art. I, §12. 
C. Unless the Court Remands for Resentencing Cox Will Be Denied his Appeal 
3
 In the federal courts, Rule 60(b) is a successor to the writ of coram nobis. See U.S. 
v. Torres, 282 F.3d 1241, 1245 n.6 (10th Cir. 2002). Also, federal courts have retained 
their authority to issue common law writs in criminal proceedings. SeeEielonu v. INS, 
355 F.3d 539, 544-45 (6th Cir. 2004). A motion for writ of coram nobis "is a step in the 
criminal case and not" a separate civil proceeding. U.S. v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 505 n. 
4 (1954); see Johnson, 635 P.2d at 38 (recognizing that coram nobis could be used to 
vacate judgment in a criminal case and to resentence a defendant to open the door to an 
appeal when the facts show that counsel's conduct deprived the defendant of the appeal). 
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In this case, private counsel represented Cox in proceedings below. After the trial 
and before sentencing, counsel filed a motion for a new trial. (See Trial Court Docket, 
attached as Addend' . : - notion for a new trial was iiiitliiidy. See Utah 
R. Crim. P. 24(c) (2004) (motion must be filed within 10 days after sentencing). 
At sentencing, counsel for Cox referenced the appeal, and stated that since the 
new trial motion was filed, "the necessity of filing an appeal is stayed pending the 
resolution of that [motion]." (See. Sentencing Transcript, attached as Addendum E, at 5; 
also Motion for a New Trial Transcript, attached as Addendum F, at 15-i /.; :- i • * . . s 
understanding of the matter was erroneous. See State v. Putnik, 2002 UT 122, ^ [5, 63 
P.3d 91; State v. Vessev. 957 P.2d 1239 (Utah App. 1998). The untimely motion did not 
stay the time for filing a notice of appeal. Utah R. App. P. 4(b) (2004). 
In order to ensure a timely appeal, counsel for Cox should have either re-filed the 
motion for a new trial within 10 days after sentencing, or filed a notice of appeal within 
30 days of the judgment. See Utah R. Crim. P. 24(c); Utah R. App. P. 4. Counsel here 
filed neither. (See Adder iciui i i D 1 lereto, at 11-15.) Where the record supports that Cox 
intended to appeal from the convictions in this matter and counsel failed to file a timelj 
notice of appeal, counsel's performance was deficient, and/or constituted malfeasance. 
See Manning, 2004 UT App 87, ^ f23 (recognizing that in cases where defendant intended 
to appeal aiid trial counsel failed to file a timely notice, defendant was denied appellate 
rights due to the malfeasance); Stewart, 506 P.2d at 75-76 (attorney's incompetence 
justifies relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)); State v. Hovater. 914 P.2d 37, 39 (Utah 
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1996) (deficient performance and prejudice constitute ineffective assistance). 
In addition, the trial court did not notify Cox at sentencing that he had 30 days to 
file an appeal. (See Addendum E); Utah R. Crim. P. 22(c) (2004) (following the 
imposition of sentence, the court shall advise defendant of the time for filing an appeal). 
Cox was prejudiced by the lack of notice and the deficient performance: If a 
notice of appeal is not timely filed, this Court must dismiss the appeal. See Johnson, 635 
P.2d at 37 (out-of-time appeals must be dismissed); Burgers v. Maiben. 652 P.2d 1320, 
1322 (Utah 1982) (dismissing appeal relating to untimely notice for lack of jurisdiction). 
In this case, Cox intended to exercise his constitutional right to appeal. (See 
Addendum F, at 15-17.) He did not waive that right. See_ Manning, 2004 UT App 87, 
^J 24-25. If this Court dismisses the appeal for jurisdictional reasons, Cox will be denied 
a fundamental right. To obviate the prejudice that may result from the deficient perfor-
mance, Cox requests that this Court invoke its authority under § 78-2a-3(l)(b), and tem-
porarily remand this case with directions to the trial court to resentence Cox so that he 
may perfect a proper appeal. See Manning, 2004 UT App 87, ffl[24-25; Hassan, Case No. 
20020885-SC; Clark, Case No. 20010819-SC; Munford, 20010413-SC. In the alterna-
tive, Cox requests that this Court temporarily remand this case for such relief and resen-
tencing under Rule 60(b)(6). See. Stewart, 506 P.2d at 75-76. Supra, subparts A & B. 
CONCLUSION 
As set forth herein, Cox respectfully requests that this Court temporarily remand 
this case with directions to resentence in order that Cox may perfect a proper appeal. 
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UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT 
RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Carolyn Roberts MANNING, Defendant and 
Appellant. 
No. 20010911-CA. 
April 11, 2002. 
Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake City, for appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Brett J. DelPorto, Salt Lake 
City, for appellee. 
Before BENCH, ORME, and THORNE, JJ. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
PER CURIAM. 
*1 This case is before the court on its own motion 
for summary disposition for lack of jurisdiction due 
to an untimely notice of appeal. Appellant pleaded 
guilty to unlawful dealing by a fiduciary and theft, 
both second degree felonies. She was sentenced on 
September 27, 2001, and the judgment was entered 
the same day. Appellant filed a pro se notice of 
appeal on November 23, 2001, beyond the statutory 
thirty-day deadline for filing a notice of appeal. See 
Utah R.App. P. 4(a). 
Because the notice of appeal was filed untimely, 
this court is deprived of jurisdiction. When a matter 
is outside the court's jurisdiction, it retains only the 
authority to dismiss the action. See Serrato v. Utah 
Transit Auth., 2000 UT App 299, 1 7, 13 P .3d 
616; State v. Palmer, 111 P.2d 521, 522 (Utah 
Ct.App.1989); Varian-Eimac v. Lamoreaux, 767 
P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct.App.1989). This court does 
not have the authority to, along with a dismissal, 
remand with instructions to resentence Appellant 
nunc pro tunc, as Appellant requests. Appellant's 
remedy, if she has been deprived of a constitutional 
right of appeal, is to seek post-conviction relief 
under Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. See State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 
(Utah 1981). 
For the reasons stated above, this appeal is 
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
RUSSELL W. BENCH, GREGORY K. ORME, 
and WILLIAM A. THORNE JR., JJ., concur. 
2002 WL 538092 (Utah App.), 2002 UT App 114 
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